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1. Introduction 
 
In the past decades  there has been a large expansion  of trade  in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Inspired by the East-Asian tigers, other countries in the region are increasingly 
participating in trade. In order to boost international trade, most Asia-Pacific countries 
pursue a policy of multilateral trade liberalization and have also entered into one or 
more regional trade agreements (RTAs). Given the increase in RTAs in other parts of 
the world, future multilateral liberalization  may take place between trading blocs 
rather than between individual  countries.  Moreover,  in response to difficulties in 
effecting multilateral trade negotiations, RTAs might demonstrate larger dynamics in 
liberalizing trade. This may be the case especially in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
China’s recent accession (2001) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a major 
step forward in the  multilateral  liberalization process. The opening of the large 
Chinese market will create new trade and investment opportunities for both China and 
its trading partners. But compared to its neighboring countries, China has to date been 
less active in joining RTAs in the Asia-Pacific Region. Nevertheless, China continues 
to further integrate with other Asian countries, as demonstrated by the recent talks 
between China and  the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN)
1.  This 
raises the question what regional trade policy is optimal for China and  what  the 
consequences are for the entire region. This paper focuses on the options for Chinese 
regionalism within the “regionalism versus multilateralism” debate. 
 
In what follows, we estimate a gravity model for a set of 23 countries in Asia and the 
Pacific over a period of 9 years (1992-2000). In particular we try to answer three 
questions: 
1.  Which countries offer the largest openness to imports and exports 
and are hence good partners for regional trade liberalization?  
2.  Are the existing RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region trade creating or 
trade diverting with respect to members and non-members? 
3.  How large are the trade potentials for each country involved if China 
joins these RTAs? 
                                                 
1 See Antkiewicz and Whalley (2004) for an overview of China’s recent RTA negotiations. See 2.3 and 
further for an overview of the member countries of ASEAN and APEC.   3 
 
We focus on three RTA-scenarios. The first two involve RTAs with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum.  The third is what we shall call the “Asian APEC”, consisting of a 
large group of Asian economies. 
 
The  gravity approach  here is  fine-tuned by some recent suggestions made in the 
literature. First, we pay particular attention to the distance-variable and, secondly, we 
apply recent panel data econometrics throughout. Finally, we take into account new 
suggestions to measure trade creation and trade diversion effects. 
 
The empirical findings point to limited effects from existing RTAs once we apply the 
appropriate methodology. Nevertheless several countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
show a large openness to trade. The formation of an RTA would hence be beneficial. 
If China joins APEC, ASEAN or a broader Asian RTA, there will be large export 
potentials for most countries. The effects of China’s integration into ASEAN are the 
largest, but the trade potentials with Southern Asia are also considerable. 
 
The gravity approach is complementary to computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models. Recent CGE-studies have looked at the impact of China’s accession to the 
WTO. Ianchovichina and Martin (2001), using the World Bank GTAP multi-country 
model, find that China and the majority of its trading partners benefit from this 
accession. Adjustment requirements are limited because of China’s liberalization 
policy in recent years. Based on a single-country CGE-model, Zhang (2004) predicts 
that China’s exports and imports will grow thanks to WTO membership. However, 
exports grow less than imports; hence the Chinese trade surplus is predicted to shrink. 
Moreover, Brown et al. (2003) show that the welfare increase from RTAs are mostly 
smaller than the gains from multilateral trade liberalization. Generally speaking, these 
CGE-studies focus on a broad range of issues affected by China’s integration in the 
world economy. The gravity model focuses on changes in bilateral total  trade only 
and is particularly useful for analyzing how trade flows are influenced by creating or 
expanding RTAs. 
   4 
In what follows, section 2 explores the benefits and disadvantages of regional trade 
policy in the Asia-Pacific region. In section 3, we use the gravity model to assess the 
impact of the current Asia-Pacific RTAs and the prospects for future regionalism in 
the region. In section 4, we consider the prospects of trade potentials for China and its 
trading partners once China joins RTAs. Finally, section 5 formulates some policy 
conclusions. 
 
2. Regionalism versus Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
2.1. Growth, Trade and Economic Ties in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Most Asia-Pacific countries experienced high economic growth during the past 
decade. However, as Table 1 shows, there are significant differences across the region 
in terms of GDP per capita and average growth rates. China’s growth performance is 
remarkable even within this group of countries. Other Asia-Pacific countries benefited 
from this high economic growth in China, as China’s growth also increased its 
imports. Hence, China’s growth is both export-driven and import-driven
2. Average 
yearly growth between 1992 and 2000 equals 15 % for exports and 14 % for imports. 
Both exports and imports almost tripled over the same period. 
 
China’s m ain trading partners are situated in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2000, 
approximately 80 % of Chinese exports went to neighboring countries. At the same 
time, China imported about 71 % of its imports from the region. Nevertheless, as 
Table 2 shows, the share of intra-regional trade declined in the 1990s. Especially the 
importance of trade with APEC went down significantly, whereas the share of 
ASEAN and SAARC increased very significantly. Average yearly import growth 
(1992-2000) equals 50 % for ASEAN and 70 % for SAARC. This is mainly driven by 
the large Chinese appetite for raw materials and capital goods. This impact of China’s 
exports on the other Asian economies has been recently investigated by Eichengreen 
et al. (2004). They find that China crowds out exports of consumer goods by less-
                                                 
2 Therefore some call China the “world’s factory”, as China processes imported basic commodities and 
raw materials – apart from capital-intensive goods – and exports final consumer goods to the entire 
world.   5 
developed Asian countries. Conversely, more advanced Asian economies benefit from 
Chinese imports of capital goods. 
 
2.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Chinese Regional Trade Policy 
 
Economic integration theory basically points to two results from forming an RTA, in 
line with  Viner (1950) and Kemp and Wan (1976).  Members benefit from trade 
creation, while non-members are hurt by trade diversion. However some countries 
may be unwilling to join an RTA, because the gains from regional liberalization are 
not always equally distributed. Unequal distribution may take place both between and 
within countries.  We summarize the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese 
membership, subsequently for China and for the region. 
 
From China’s perspective, RTAs are likely to be trade-creating. Chinese exports will 
benefit from increased market access to neighboring countries, but RTAs are 
beneficial to China’s imports as well. China is already an important importer of raw 
materials from  the region. Cheaper imports of these products will improve the 
competitiveness of the Chinese manufacturing sector, which is the main driving froce 
behind China’s recent successful economic performance.  Apart from trade creation, 
China may  experience trade diversion caused by RTAs  in which  it does not 
participate. From this perspective, Baldwin’s (1993) “domino theory of regionalism” 
is applicable to China.  That is, i f China experiences trade diversion because other 
countries form an RTA, then it becomes more likely that China will also pursue a 
policy of regional integration
3.  If China is excluded from all RTAs, it would be 
severely hurt by trade diversion. In this case, it is optimal to pursue an active regional 
trade policy in order to join one or more RTAs. 
 
From the viewpoint of the other countries in the region, access to the large and 
expanding Chinese market should result in large export opportunities and hence trade 
creation. Advanced countries in the region, and also other emerging markets  will 
benefit from  increased Chinese openness. On the other hand, Asia-Pacific countries 
                                                 
3  Baldwin (1993) uses sunk costs (transportation costs) as an argument for economic integration. 
Alternative mechanisms can be applied. One example is attracting FDI. Regional integration can make 
smaller countries more attractive to foreign investors that prefer currently to invest in the large Chinese 
market.   6 
fear  competition from  China with its large inward FDI flows.  However, RTAs 
including China may  attract FDI  into other Asian economies as well, as foreign 
investors circumvent the external barriers. Investors will screen the entire region and 
they will choose their optimal production location in order to serve the entire RTA-
region. 
 
Finally, RTAs are important politically. Given China’s increasing political power, 
increased trade relationships are an important instrument  internationally. For other 
Asian countries strong trade ties with China may serve as a guarantee for regional 
safety and stability, which is a major concern of all existing RTAs. Hence from this 
perspective, regionalism might be the optimal choice for the entire region
4.  
 
2.3. Options for China’s Regional Trade Policy 
 
Given that there are reasonable arguments in favor of further regional trade initiatives 
involving China, the question becomes which RTA is preferable. We assume three 
integration scenarios in what follows. 
 
China is  presently  involved in two regional initiatives that focus on trade 
liberalization
5. First, there have been negotiations with  ASEAN and an extended 
ASEAN to include, next to China, Japan and Korea, mostly referred to as ASEAN+3. 
Secondly, China is already a member of APEC. Although APEC consists of a large 
variety of countries, the organization also aims at increased trade liberalization. 
 
ASEAN is not a homogeneous group. There is a clear gap between  the more 
developed member countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand) and some poorer countries, which joined ASEAN at a later stage 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). This heterogeneity hampers the planning 
                                                 
4 Some argue that discriminatory liberalization - which is the case in most RTAs – could improve 
Asia’s negotiating position in  the WTO  multilateral  negotiations. Such  liberalization offers the 
continent a means of retaliation against other trading blocs. This may involve a “yen bloc” or “Asian 
bloc”, apart from the EU and NAFTA. But many countries already have an outward-looking policy. So 
one can wonder who will be affected by this discriminatory policy. The United States especially is 
wary of Asian trade integration and might retaliate. For this reason Panagariya (1994) argues against 
any Asian RTA, as the costs outweigh the benefits.  
5 There are more initiatives, but these two might be considered as the most important ones.   7 
for further regional trade liberalization. Although ASEAN was founded in 1962, the 
organization launched AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) only in 1992. The agenda on 
economic integration has been adapted several times since then. For now, ASEAN 
aims at forming an RTA among the six richer and founding members in 2010 with a 
complete elimination of all import tariffs. The newer members will join the RTA in 
2015. Some exceptions are to be made for sensitive products. These exceptions may 
be crucial for AFTA’s success.  Meanwhile the six founding members plan to form an 
RTA with reduced tariff rates under the so-called Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff Scheme (CEPT).  
 
Most members of ASEAN are also part of APEC, except for Myanmar, Laos and 
Cambodia. APEC is predominantly concerned with trade and other economic issues, 
and can hardly be called a real RTA. Compared to ASEAN, APEC consists of a much 
larger group of countries, including advanced economies like the United States, 
Australia and Japan, but also emerging economies from South America, Asia and 
even Russia.  
 
Both  ASEAN+3 and APEC offer prospects for RTAs for China. However, there 
might  be additional options to consider for China.  In particular increased trade 
liberalization among a larger group of Asian economies may be worthwhile. We will 
refer to this option as “Asian APEC”. In South Asia some modest attempts are being 
made to increase regional trade. The South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) consists of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Bhutan and the Maldives. These countries set up the South Asian Preferential Trading 
Agreements (SAPTA), which was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1996, in 
order to gradually achieve an RTA among them
6 (Gupta 2002). We thus consider a 
broad Asian RTA, including the SAARC and ASEAN countries, but also Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, as a third regional trade policy option for China. This 
option reflects empirical evidence that trade between South and East Asia is growing 
rapidly (RIS 2002: 98). Moreover, an RTA between the two largest countries in Asia, 
China and India, undoubtedly may create large trade opportunities.  
 
                                                 
6 This gradual approach may subsequently involve the formation of a Free Trade Area, a Custom Union 
and a full Economic Union.   8 
We  thus use ASEAN, APEC and the “Asian APEC” as three scenarios in  what 
follows.  
 
3. Impact and Prospects of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
3.1. Gravity Model and Data 
 
The gravity model is a popular tool in empirical trade analysis. In particular it is 
useful to analyze the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade flows. We use the following 
gravity model specification: 
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ijt E   export flow in year t from country i to country j 
it Y   country i’s GDP in year t 
jt Y   country j’s GDP in year t 
it POP   country i’s population in year t 
jt POP   country j’s population in year t 
it RER   real exchange rate between the exporters’ currency and the USD in 
period t 
jt RER   real exchange rate between the importers’ currency and the USD in 
period t 
ij DIS   distance between country i and j 
k D   dummies (k=1,…) capturing geographical and cultural effects 
ijt e   error-term (see details and varying assumptions below) 
 
There exists a very large number of studies using the gravity approach. These studies 
are sometimes criticized for lack of theoretical foundations and econometric 
shortcomings. But in the previous two decades several authors have contributed to fill 
this theoretical vacuum (e.g., Bergstrand 1985, Bergstrand 1989, Deardorff 1998; and   9 
Evenett and Keller 2002). For some recent overviews regarding the wide literature on 
gravity  models,  see  Feenstra et al.  (2001), Greenway and Milner (2002),  and 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).  It can be said accordingly that the  basic 
expression of the gravity model has solid theoretical underpinnings. 
 
Dummy variables will be added to the basic specification, to capture geographical and 
cultural common effects. In particular dummies are included for common borders, for 
islands (exporters and importer separately) and common language.  The language 
dummies refer to English, Chinese and Spanish
7. These dummies equal one if the 
language is well-understood in both trading partners. 
 
Panel data are used for 23 countries over a time period of 9 years (1992-2000). From 
APEC and  ASEAN  we i nclude: Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea (Republic of Korea), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Philippines, Russia (Russian Federation), Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the United 
States. Five other countries are included to represent the entire Asia-Pacific region: 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Some smaller countries in the 
region are left out because of data limitations
8. 
 
Bilateral trade data are based on export data from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (UN-COMTRADE), expressed in US dollars. If export data are unavailable, 
they are replaced – if possible – by import data (the reverse side of the same trade 
flow). See Appendix A for more details. There is only a limited number of missing 
observations. 
 
Data for GDP and population are from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook
9. 
Population is expressed in midyear estimates (thousands).  GDP is expressed in 
millions of U.S. dollars at constant 1990-prices. The conversion rates used to convert 
national currency into U.S. dollars are the period averages of market exchange rates, 
                                                 
7 In reality there may be several languages in the region that are related to each other and might 
influence trade flows. We define common language minimally, i.e., widespread in both countries. 
8 The following countries are not included: Brunei (APEC, ASEAN), Papua New Guinea (APEC), 
Vietnam (APEC, ASEAN), Cambodja (ASEAN), Laos (ASEAN), Myanmar (ASEAN), Bhutan 
(SAARC) and Maldives (SAARC). 
9 GDP data for Taiwan come from Datastream.   10 
taken from IMF – Financial Statistics. Data for languages, border and island effects 
come from CIA World Fact Book (2004). 
 
Real exchange rates of the importing and exporting country are added to the gravity 
specification, as exchange rate adjustments have occurred during the financial turmoil 
during the 1990s. These exchange rate changes influence the volume of trade, as well 
as the value of trade expressed in U.S. dollars. Real exchange rates are based on IMF 
data: the period-average nominal exchange rate is multiplied by the U.S. over the 
domestic GDP-deflator for each exporter and importer separately. 
 
Distances are interpreted geographically and expressed  as the  distance (in km) 
between the capital cities
10. Often the interpretation of its corresponding coefficient 
goes beyond geographic distance  and may also reflect trading c osts,  or at least 
transportation costs.  But often also trade barriers are proportional to geographical 
distance. Polak (1996) shows that the use of absolute distance in the gravity model 
underestimates bilateral trade, as the average distance between a country and its 
trading partners varies considerably. An incorrect measure of distance may thus lead 
to an incorrect interpretation of included dummy variables.  Since this is important for 
measuring RTA-effects, as  explained below, we will use an alternative distance 
variable. Instead of using the absolute distance between a country and its trading 
partner, distance is scaled by weighted distance between the country and all its trading 
partners. The shares of each country’s exports in world exports are used as weights in 
this relative distance measure. 
 
Table 3  show OLS-estimates of the gravity model for the  Asia-Pacific region. 
Equation (1.1) uses the traditional distance-variable, whereas in Equation (1.2) 
Polak’s scaled distance variable is used instead. The reported coefficient estimates are 
in line with most other gravity estimations. Economic growth, measured by an 
increase in GDP, causes higher exports. Exports are more elastic to the exporter’s 
income than to the importer’s income. Population  has  also  a positive effect on 
exports,  whereas real exchange rates are insignificant. D istance influences exports 
negatively. Surprisingly, we observe a larger negative effect from scaled distance 
                                                 
10 www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Data/Gravity/dist.txt   11 
compared to absolute distance. Contrary to Polak’s findings, within the Asia-Pacific 
region, absolute distance overestimates bilateral exports
11. The geographical effects 
are not significantly different from zero, whereas common language has a large 
impact on trade. 
 
3.2. Trade Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Knowing w hich countries in the Asia-Pacific region are most open to exports and 
imports might help to choose a beneficial RTA for China and the region as a whole. 
We can get this information by adding dummy variables for each exporter and each 
importer country  to the basic gravity specification  (Matyas  1997, and Harris and 
Matyas 2001).  These dummies capture country-specific effects that determine the 
regional export flows even if we control for income, population, distance and real 
exchange rate. It is assumed that these effects are constant over time. A positive 
estimated coefficient indicates openness to trade, as exports are higher than estimated 
by the basic gravity model. As we drop the dummy for one country in order to avoid 
the dummy variable trap, the estimated coefficients should be interpreted as openness 
relative to this reference country. The selection of this reference country is often 
arbitrary, although this choice influences both the estimates of the basic gravity 
coefficients and – to a limited extent – the ranking of the fixed effects. 
 
We estimate the gravity model including these country-fixed effects by OLS. This is 
equivalent to the fixed effects estimator for panel data. Note that we introduce 
country-effects. Alternatively we could have introduced country-pair fixed effects
12. 
OLS is preferred to (feasible) generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation because 
our time dimension is small relative to the cross-sectional dimension. One needs 
sufficient time-periods to estimate the variances (and possibly co-variances) for each 
country-pair. Hence FGLS does not provide consistent estimates in our dataset. 
 
                                                 
11 Polak (1996) looks at a wider sample of countries. His comment seems justified for a large group of 
countries, although apparently it doesn’t hold in this regional study. 
12 In addition one can add time dummies. These results are not reported here, as we are more interested 
in the country-specific effects. Given the relatively short time dimension in our data, adding time 
dummies reduces the significance of the income and population dummies.   12 
Note that the introduction of these fixed effects is in line with Polak’s (1996) 
comment on distance. Therefore we use absolute distance instead of scaled distance 
whenever country-specific effects are added to the gravity model. Hence, the fixed 
effects suggested by Matyas (1997) and  Harris and Matyas (2001) reflect both 
openness to trade and geographical closeness to trading partners. Note also that in the 
fixed-effect specification the geographical dummies can no longer be included 
because of multicollinearity problems. 
 
The results are reported in  Table  4.  The exporter and importer fixed effects are 
ranked. Countries like Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea are high-ranking. It 
appears that both the most advanced countries and the East-Asian tigers are most open 
to trade. China is relatively open to exports, but relatively closed as an importer. The 
reverse holds for Chile. Because the most open countries have larger trade flows than 
predicted by the gravity model for the entire Asia-Pacific region, these countries are 
the preferred candidates to join an RTA.  
 
3.3. Current Impact of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
Although the openness-to-trade effects might seem somewhat abstract, an effective 
RTA should consist of countries showing a large openness to trade.  To take into 
account the effect of the existing RTAs, more specifically ASEAN and APEC, we use 
an approach that is complementary to other gravity studies that investigate the impact 
of RTAs in a larger sample of countries, ultimately the world (e.g., Frankel 1997, 
Frankel and Wei 1998).   
 
Traditionally, the impact of an RTA is measured in the gravity model by adding a 
dummy that equals 1 if both the exporter and the importer belong to the RTA. Table 5 
shows the result of measuring this  general  RTA-effect both in a fixed-effects 
specification and a random-effects specification. In the fixed-effects specification, 
exports are higher within both APEC and ASEAN. As all ASEAN-countries in this 
study  also belong to APEC, a significantly positive effect for ASEAN, while 
controlling for APEC-membership, is a strong result. However, in the random-effects 
specification this result no longer holds. 
   13 
Based on the Haussman and Breusch-Pagan tests for random versus fixed effects, the 
fixed effects estimator is preferred. Nevertheless, the fixed effects estimator cannot be 
used if we want to split up the general RTA-effect into more detailed effects
13. In 
order to capture more detailed trade effects from ASEAN and APEC, we follow the 
methodology suggested by Soloaga and Winters (2001).  We use exports as  the 
dependent variable  whereas Soloaga and Winters use imports.  Therefore we 
reinterpret their methodology in terms of exports. Instead of adding 1 dummy that 
equals 1 if both trading partners belong to a particular RTA, Soloaga and Winters 
(2001) disentangle this total integration effect into trade creation and trade diversion 
effects. Consequently, for each RTA 3 dummies are included: 
 
qj qj qi qi qj qi q ijt ijt R R R R A E n n j + + + = ln   (2) 
 
where 
ijt A   Is the basic gravity specification (1) 
qp R   is a  dummy equal to one if country  p  belongs to RTA  q, zero 
otherwise (p= I,j) 
 
This methodology allows us to distinguish between  import diversion and  export 
diversion. An RTA is defined to be import diverting if its members tend to import less 
than estimated by the basic gravity model, ceteris paribus the fact that both trading 
partners belong to the same RTA. This corresponds to  0 < qj n . Similarly, an RTA is 
export diverting if its members export less than estimated, subject to the same ceteris 
paribus condition (or  0 < qi n ). While the import diversion effect is quite common in 
the integration literature, export diversion is often neglected. Separating the trade 
diversion effects allows a correct interpretation of the pure intra-bloc trade creation 
effect, which is positive if  0 > q j . 
 
Table 6 reports the result of this experiment, after controlling for a large set of other 
effects.  There is no  evidence of intra-bloc trade creation effects from ASEAN-
membership or APEC-membership. For ASEAN, there are no significant results at all, 
                                                 
13 These effects would be linear combinations of the country-specific effects.    14 
whereas APEC members  have higher exports and imports  than predicted  by the 
gravity model for the entire region. According to these results, APEC does not divert 
trade from non-members to members. 
 
These results are in line with other studies. In a study for a large sample of countries, 
Frankel et al. (1995) find a large intra-regional trade bias in East Asia, and even more 
in APEC. This corresponds to the observation that shares of intra-regional trade to 
total trade are increasing. The formation of RTAs however has a limited impact on 
this intra-regional trade bias. High economic growth in the region instead seems to be 
the main determinant of regional bilateral trade flows. From a theoretical point of 
view, adding information on RTAs does not improve the basic gravity model. 
 
Sharma and Shua (2000) estimate a gravity model for 5 countries separately 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) for the period 1980-1995. 
They use data on bilateral trade from these 5 countries with all countries in the world. 
They confirm the Frankel et al. (1995) finding that economic growth is the main 
determinant of regional trade in East-Asia. The impact of ASEAN seems 
insignificant, while trade with APEC-members has a positive impact on the level of 
trade. Panagariya (1994) does not find evidence of positive effects from the creation 
of AFTA either. Even other East-Asian trading blocs do not appear to be beneficial. 
Only open regionalism has some advantages. A similar study by Hassan (2001) for 
South Asia, with a specific focus on Bangladesh, uses 27 countries. He finds that 
RTAs in South Asia are neither trade creating nor trade diverting. He expects positive 
trade-creating effects from RTAs in South Asia only if they are accompanied by other 
structural policies like encouraging FDI and deepening of capital markets. 
 
4. Trade Potentials from China’s Regional Trade Liberalization 
 
Evidence from the recent past about the positive trade creation effects of RTAs is 
important for policy makers. Equally important is the knowledge about eventual trade 
diversion effects if one does not join  an RTA. However, from the Chinese 
perspective, it is even more interesting to know how large trade benefits will be once 
China joins particular RTAs. Similarly, China’s trading partners may want to know   15 
how large the impact will be on their bilateral trade with China, if China becomes 
more integrated in the region.  
 
In this paragraph we calculate these trade potentials. The gravity model is not only 
useful to find out the determinants of bilateral trade flows and the impact of RTAs. It 
can also be used to predict future trade flows. In particular it is often used to calculate 
trade potentials, i.e., the difference between the predicted and the actual bilateral trade 
flow. Predictions are based on the gravity model estimates. A crucial condition for 
valuable predictions is a correct estimation of the gravity model, as the estimation 
method and model specification affect the predicted potentials. We estimate the model 
by the fixed-effects OLS-estimator, corrected for heteroskedasticity
14. 
 
In order to access the trade potentials between China and its trading partners, we 
compare actual trade flows to the trade flows predicted by three gravity estimations, 
i.e. for ASEAN, APEC and the “Asian APEC”.  Although China formally belongs to 
APEC, China is excluded from the original estimation, so as not to get an in-sample 
prediction. The gravity model is more suited for out-of-sample predictions than for in-
sample predictions. In-sample predictions basically regard the estimation error as the 
trade potential. There are reasons to argue that this is not always appropriate (see e.g., 
Egger 2002). 
 
The estimation results are shown in T able 7.  The geographical variables (border, 
islands) are not reported as they were insignificant or in conflict with the fixed effects. 
The Chinese-dummy  was also dropped since it would be  influenced by  China’s 
exclusion from the estimation. Additionally, the English-dummy and Spanish-dummy 
were dropped in the case of ASEAN and “Asian APEC”. 
 
These findings are similar to the findings for the entire region. The income elasticity 
of exports is smaller for the “Asian APEC” compared to ASEAN and APEC. The 
exporter’s real exchange rate versus the USD  has no impact on exports. The same 
holds for the importer’s real exchange rate for ASEAN and APEC. Both distance and 
                                                 
14 Alternatively, we used a random-effects estimator to calculate trade potentials. We prefer the fixed 
effects estimator as the model including country-specific effects better fits the variation in the data. 
Hence potential trade is less influenced by estimation errors.   16 
the fixed effects are very significant, indicating that country-specific features and 
trade impediments influence regional trade considerably. 
 
Based on these estimations the export prospects for China and its trading partners can 
be calculated.  Table  8  gives an overview for the  three scenarios.  The projected 
percentage changes, averaged over time
15, are presented and  point to large trade 
potentials in any scenario.  
 
First, w e discuss the Chinese export potentials.  In the APEC-scenario, Chinese 
exports to most trading partners increase with the largest export increases for Korea, 
Philippines, Mexico and Thailand. Exports are projected to be up to 6 times higher 
than current export flows.  There are more moderate increases  for Peru and Chile, 
whereas exports to Hong Kong, Taiwan and Russia are expected to decline. The 
decline for Hong Kong and Taiwan can be explained by the intense and special trade 
relationship with China. Compared to the APEC-results, the trade potentials from 
China’s integration into ASEAN are  even  much larger. Export potentials exceed 
actual figures more than 20 times, except for Indonesia with a factor of 7. Clearly 
ASEAN-membership  would bring about a very large increase in Chinese exports. 
Finally, the projections from the “Asian APEC”-scenario are more diversified. For the 
partner countries that belong to APEC, the findings are similar to the APEC-scenario. 
In addition there are large export potentials to the SAARC-countries, especially Sri 
Lanka and India.  
 
Next, the findings for the partner countries’ export potentials to China are similar to 
the Chinese export projections.  In the APEC-scenario, export potentials for most 
trading partners exceed China’s projected export growth. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Russia 
and Peru face reduced exports in this scenario. For Canada and Chile, export 
potentials are  also moderate. In the ASEAN-scenario, to the contrary, export 
potentials for the trading partners are smaller than  for China, except for Indonesia. 
Still large export opportunities to China are expected for all countries. Finally, all 
APEC-members benefit less from the “Asian APEC” scenario than from the APEC-
scenario, or they are hurt even more. For the SAARC-countries this scenario is very 
                                                 
15 The results for each separate year are available upon request.   17 
positive. All South Asian countries, except for Nepal, experience large trade increases 
that exceed China’s projected increases. 
 
Some of these predictions may seem rather high at first glance. Nevertheless, export 
growth performance in the Asia-Pacific region was also remarkable during the past 
two decades. Moreover, trade barriers within the region are still rather high. Hence, 
the predicted trade potentials should be interpreted as long-run tendencies as it takes 
time to eliminate barriers to trade, especially  in sensitive sectors. The predicted 
outcomes are realistic, conditional on the realization of the assumed levels of 
integration. These potentials not only indicate the general tendencies, but also show 
the heterogeneous impact of China’s rise on the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
To summarize, these three scenarios point to large trade potentials if China integrates 
into RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN appears to offer large mutual benefits, 
whereas APEC and an “Asian APEC” have more divergent effects. Nevertheless, also 
in the latter two scenarios regional bilateral exports are expected to  increase 
significantly.  These integration effects happen apart from the impact of economic 
growth
16. Given the pattern of continuous high economic growth in the region, this 




China’s performance in terms of economic growth and trade is astonishing. To 
safeguard a prosperous future, it is optimal both for China and its regional trading 
partners to create an economic environment based on trade liberalization and 
economic cooperation. The main Asia-Pacific RTAs, ASEAN and APEC, currently 
have only a limited impact on intra-regional trade flows, but China’s entrance into the 
RTAs creates large export potentials for the entire region. Further trade liberalization 
with South Asian countries is beneficial as well. 
 
In the short run, trade liberalization between China and the ASEAN-countries may be 
the most realistic option. In particular the set-up of an ASEAN+3, including Japan 
                                                 
16 Estimates for importer’s and exporter’s GDP are significantly positive.    18 
and Korea, is a promising strategy. Trade creation will be large for all countries, 
although China in particular will benefit from it. In the longer run, however, it would 
be  worthwhile to extend this ASEAN+3 in order to i nclude more countries. In 
particular the South Asian economies seem viable candidates to join the Asian RTA.  
 
Least beneficial will be China’s regionalism for Taiwan and Hong Kong, who both 
have a special trade relationship with China. For Russia and Latin  America, except 
Mexico,  Chinese RTA-membership will have only small or even negative 
consequences. Finally all advanced countries in the region will benefit from Chinese 
regionalism, although to a smaller extent than the emerging economies. 
 
Given the projected benefits from RTA-membership,  it is beneficial for China to 
combine multilateral trade liberalization as a WTO-member with continued regional 
liberalization.   This  trade policy, together with high economic growth, will propel 
Asia even further as a dynamic region during the coming decades. 
   19 
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APPENDIX A: Export versus Import Data 
 
 
The export-data from Indonesia to Thailand and Taiwan are replaced by import-values (1992-2000). This is also the case for the exports (all 
years) from Singapore to Indonesia; Chile to Hong Kong, Taiwan and Pakistan; from Peru to Taiwan, from Russia to Taiwan, from Bangladesh 
to Taiwan and from Sri Lanka to Taiwan. All export-data are replaced by import-values in the case of Russia for 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996; 
Pakistan for 1994; Bangladesh for 1999 and 2000; and Sri Lanka for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2000. The following values are missing: 
export from Indonesia to Nepal (1992 and 1996), in the case of Peru no data are available for Taiwan (1993), Nepal (1992,1993) and Sri Lanka 
(2000), for Russia no data for Bangladesh (1994), Nepal (1992, 1993, 1995), Pakistan (1994) and Sri Lanka (1995); for Nepal no data for 
Indonesia (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000), Thailand (1994, 1999, 2000), Australia (2000), Canada (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000), USA 
(1992, 1993, 1995), India (1992,1993, 1994, 1995) and Pakistan (1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999); for Bangladesh no data for Taiwan (1995, 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: GDP, Growth and Inflation in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
APEC ASEAN SAARC GDP 2003, current 
prices, USD billions
GDP per capita 2003, 
current prices, USD billions
GDP, constant prices, 
annual percentage 
change, yearly average 
1992-2003
Inflation, annual percentage 
change, yearly average 1992-
2003
Australia x 493.359 24684.777 3.7 2.5
Brunei Darussalam x x 4.421 12335.264 1.6 1.5
Canada x 859.909 27199.368 3.2 1.8
Chile x 69.693 4407.548 5.4 6.9
People's Republic of China x 1372.045 1061.548 9.6 6.0
Hong Kong, China x 159.195 23125.446 3.7 3.0
Indonesia x x 206.542 945.535 3.8 13.5
Japan x 4190.728 32859.177 1.2 0.2
Republic of Korea x 515.349 10640.89 5.4 4.3
Malaysia x x 101.019 4041.99 5.9 3.1
Mexico x 615.261 6006.149 2.8 15.0
New Zealand x 73.404 18497.344 3.3 2.1
Papua New Guinea x 3.178 568.529 3.1 10.6
Peru x 61.244 2153.575 4.0 21.4
Philippines x x 81.86 1010.327 3.6 6.6
The Russian Federation x 428.798 2991.842 -1.3 280.6
Singapore x x 89.737 21183.736 5.9 1.3
Chinese Taipei x 288.797 12660.342 5.1 1.9
Thailand x x 130.767 2036.701 4.2 3.6
United States of America x 10875.348 37312.45 3.2 2.5
Vietnam x x 36.707 454.582 6.9 8.3
Cambodia x 3.847 279.677 5.6 19.9
Laos x 2.097 367.102 6.4 29.1
Myanmar x 9.605 180.371 7.8 28.4
Bangladesh x 53.615 368.135 5.0 4.8
Bhutan x 0.615 740.773 6.5 7.4
India x 556.064 520.347 5.7 7.4
Maldives x 0.669 2121.785 6.9 4.3
Nepal x 5.932 229.51 4.2 7.8
Pakistan x 72.766 488.261 3.7 7.5
SriLanka x 17.774 881.365 4.6 9.7 
Source: IMF (2004) – Financial Statistics   24 
Table 2: Chinese Trade Statistics 
 
Chinese Exports  Chinese Imports
in billions USD
Total Value of Trade in 1992 84.94 80.59
Total Value of Trade in 2000 249.20 225.09
Total Value of Trade in 2003 438.23 412.76
in %
Growth 1992-2000 193.39 179.32
Average Growth per annum 24.17 22.42
Average Yearly Growth 14.98 14.33
Share APEC in Total Trade (1992) 80.81 72.41
Share APEC in Total Trade (2000) 71.34 60.54
Share ASEAN in Total Trade (1992) 5.50 5.48
Share ASEAN in Total Trade (2000) 6.96 9.85
Share SAARC in Total Trade (1992) 1.26 0.35
Share SAARC in Total Trade (2000) 1.51 0.84
Average Growth trade with APEC per annum (1992-2000) 19.88 16.69
Average Growth trade with ASEAN per annum (1992-2000) 33.93 50.33
Average Growth trade with SAARC per annum (1992-2000) 31.71 70.13 
Source: based on UN (2004) - COMTRADE 
 
 
Table 3: Basic Gravity Model Estimates 
 
Est. Coef. S.E. Est. Coef. S.E.
GDP exporter 0.955 (*) 0.073 0.971 (*) 0.073
GDP importer 0.677 (*) 0.067 0.678 (*) 0.067
Pop exporter 0.148 (*) 0.082 0.135 (*) 0.082
Pop importer 0.183 (*) 0.075 0.181 (*) 0.075
RER exporter -0.014 0.040 -0.011 0.040
RER importer -0.029 0.043 -0.033 0.043
Distance -0.325 (*) 0.145
Scaled Distance -0.379 (*) 0.147
Border-effect 0.285 0.446 0.240 0.448
Island Exporter 0.029 0.258 0.025 0.258
Island Importer -0.051 0.250 -0.067 0.249
English 2.012 (*) 0.205 2.001 (*) 0.203
Chinese 2.488 (*) 0.576 2.480 (*) 0.562
Spanish 2.172 (*) 0.314 2.057 (*) 0.319
Constant -2.481 (*) 1.858 -5.471 (*) 1.278
Dependent Variable: Exports (OLS-estimates)
1.1 1.2
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Table 4: Fixed Effect Estimates 
 
Est. Coef. S.E.
GDP exporter 0.240 (*) 0.077
GDP importer 0.279 (*) 0.052
Pop exporter 0.059 0.049
Pop importer 0.283 (*) 0.070
RER exporter 0.063 0.077
RER importer -0.226 (*) 0.105
Distance -0.797 (*) 0.085
English 0.624 (*) 0.258
Chinese 1.010 (*) 0.306
Spanish 1.075 (*) 0.410
Constant 20.916 (*) 1.708
FE exp. Japan -0.835 0.589
FE exp. Singapore -1.492 (*) 0.565
FE exp. Hong Kong -1.564 (*) 0.556
FE exp. China -1.695 (*) 0.511
FE exp. Australia -2.201 (*) 0.471
FE exp. Korea -2.318 (*) 0.771
FE exp. Malaysia -2.399 (*) 0.554
FE exp. Canada -2.520 (*) 0.430
FE exp. New Zealand -2.800 (*) 0.567
FE exp. Thailand -2.844 (*) 0.563
FE exp. Indonesia -3.094 (*) 0.793
FE exp. Russia -3.537 (*) 0.490
FE exp. India -3.600 (*) 0.546
FE exp. Chili -3.705 (*) 0.787
FE exp. Mexico -4.212 (*) 0.557
FE exp. Philipines -4.383 (*) 0.639
FE exp. Peru -4.460 (*) 0.605
FE exp. Pakistan -4.489 (*) 0.636
FE exp. Sri Lanka -5.081 (*) 0.744
FE exp. Bangladesh -6.242 (*) 0.674
FE exp. Taiwan -8.026 (*) 0.744
FE exp. Nepal -8.567 (*) 1.060
FE imp. Japan 0.899 0.698
FE imp. Hong Kong 0.194 0.573
FE imp. Chili -0.216 0.850
FE imp. Korea -0.324 0.856
FE imp. Singapore -0.417 0.591
FE imp. Indonesia -0.960 0.929
FE imp. Canada -0.991 (*) 0.495
FE imp. Australia -1.160 (*) 0.494
FE imp. Thailand -1.167 (*) 0.595
FE imp. Philipines -1.199 (*) 0.599
FE imp. China -1.321 (*) 0.586
FE imp. Sri Lanka -1.530 (*) 0.735
FE imp. Malaysia -1.718 (*) 0.580
FE imp. New Zealand -2.005 (*) 0.615
FE imp. Mexico -2.014 (*) 0.526
FE imp. Peru -2.566 (*) 0.590
FE imp. Bangladesh -2.863 (*) 0.644
FE imp. India -3.070 (*) 0.609
FE imp. Pakistan -3.185 (*) 0.657
FE imp. Nepal -3.632 (*) 0.745
FE imp. Russia -3.667 (*) 0.590
FE imp. Taiwan -4.366 (*) 0.805
R² = 0.8143
2.1
S.E. are Huber-White, corrected for pair-wise heteroskedasticity
F(54,505) = 55.39
     Importer Fixed Effects (sorted)
     Exporter Fixed Effects (sorted)
Dependent Variable: Exports  
(*)= Significantly different from zero at 10 % level
OLS-estimates with FE
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Table 5: Testing for General RTA-effects 
 
Est. Coef. White S.E. Est. Coef. S.E.
GDP exporter 0.236 (*) 0.077 0.442 (*) 0.033
GDP importer 0.285 (*) 0.052 0.293 (*) 0.032
Pop exporter 0.047 0.049 0.178 (*) 0.027
Pop importer 0.270 (*) 0.067 0.249 (*) 0.033
RER exporter 0.066 0.077 -0.024 0.031
RER importer -0.225 (*) 0.105 -0.105 (*) 0.031
Distance -0.647 (*) 0.094
Scaled Distance -0.417 (*) 0.127
English 0.541 (*) 0.259 2.120 (*) 0.204
Chinese 1.043 (*) 0.311 1.475 (*) 0.502
Spanish 1.329 (*) 0.432 1.543 (*) 0.623
ASEAN-membership 0.505 (*) 0.239 0.292 0.529
APEC-membership 0.997 (*) 0.499 2.600 (*) 0.218
Constant 18.830 (*) 1.916 2.813 (*) 0.618
R² = 0.8169 R² overall = 0.5444
F(56,505) = 58.23 Chi² (15) = 910.25
3.2
GLS-estimates (random effects estimator)
(*)= Significantly different from zero at 10 % level
Dependent Variable: Exports  




Table 6: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects from APEC and ASEAN 
 
Est. Coef. S.E.
GDP exporter 0.409369 (*) 0.03442
GDP importer 0.289095 (*) 0.034217
Pop exporter 0.165996 (*) 0.028065
Pop importer 0.216515 (*) 0.036011
RER exporter -0.02167 0.03207
RER importer -0.1125 (*) 0.031954
Scaled Distance -0.56324 (*) 0.141055
Border-effect 0.524246 0.465294
Island Exporter -0.67881 (*) 0.225886
Island Importer -0.57075 (*) 0.232287
English 2.415256 (*) 0.218689
Chinese 1.437021 (*) 0.500781
Spanish 0.90735 0.636171
ASEAN export diversion -0.10494 0.280667
ASEAN import diversion -0.40853 0.281296
ASEAN intra-bloc trade creation 0.262034 0.587364
APEC export diversion 2.295662 (*) 0.571398
APEC import diversion 1.615285 (*) 0.57426
APEC intra-bloc trade creation 0.746425 0.58981
Constant 2.036256 (*) 0.813608
4.1
Dependent Variable: Exports
GLS-estimates (random effects estimator)
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Table 7: Gravity Model Estimates under 3 Scenarios 
 
Est. Coef. S.E. Est. Coef. S.E. Est. Coef. S.E.
GDP exporter 0.405448 (*) 0.082472 0.32733 (*) 0.108835 0.153182 (*) 0.058182
GDP importer 0.412305 (*) 0.103409 0.461637 (*) 0.133054 0.198046 (*) 0.058238
Pop exporter 0.06335 (*) 0.024875 0.194009 (*) 0.074917 0.056879 0.079239
Pop importer 0.212164 (*) 0.062628 0.189744 (*) 0.062128 0.112791 (*) 0.039737
RER exporter -0.01538 0.095939 0.215484 0.411897 0.278291 0.205376
RER importer -0.20619 (*) 0.086272 0.456058 0.419552 -0.1058 0.318068
Distance -0.82489 (*) 0.089806 -0.51829 (*) 0.170052 -0.90655 (*) 0.177199
English 0.176909 0.286613
Spanish 1.23293 (*) 0.378052
Constant 17.21427 (*) 2.020869 15.26804 (*) 2.15655 24.28829 (*) 14.45
FE exp. Australia -1.22324 (*) 0.334712
FE exp. Bangladesh -6.35814 (*) 0.746295
FE exp. Canada -1.50473 (*) 0.246327
FE exp. Chili -1.98882 (*) 0.765384
FE exp. China
FE exp. Hong Kong -0.03809 0.465045 -0.77437 (*) 0.426749
FE exp. India -3.2163 (*) 0.793788
FE exp. Indonesia -1.38277 (*) 0.816588 -4.29268 2.925411 -3.22112 (*) 1.554435
FE exp. Japan 0.02845 0.552775 -0.76074 0.981413
FE exp. Korea -0.95642 0.795068 -2.19933 (*) 1.323256
FE exp. Malaysia -0.87457 (*) 0.41049 -1.46967 (*) 0.20932 -1.22795 (*) 0.325062
FE exp. Mexico -3.10295 (*) 0.465762
FE exp. Nepal -8.43367 (*) 1.086757
FE exp. New Zealand -1.51035 (*) 0.431697
FE exp. Pakistan -3.89482 (*) 0.698086
FE exp. Peru -3.33526 (*) 0.513414
FE exp. Philipines -2.44177 (*) 0.545785 -3.56824 (*) 1.252405 -4.08321 (*) 0.730209
FE exp. Russia -3.40018 (*) 0.382744
FE exp. Singapore -0.09897 0.435569
FE exp. Sri Lanka -5.07791 (*) 0.75861
FE exp. Taiwan -6.62525 (*) 0.661821 -8.63968 (*) 0.753837
FE exp. Thailand -1.38257 (*) 0.476754 -2.74746 (*) 1.218645 -2.33713 (*) 0.668304
FE imp. Australia -1.10257 (*) 0.515982
FE imp. Bangladesh -2.41098 (*) 1.072226
FE imp. Canada -0.98767 (*) 0.494988
FE imp. Chili -0.38529 0.86183
FE imp. China
FE imp. Hong Kong 0.564697 0.616563 0.55017 0.575715
FE imp. India -2.36377 (*) 1.001469
FE imp. Indonesia -0.5646 0.894254 -6.59089 (*) 3.154694 -1.04959 2.240752
FE imp. Japan 0.623337 0.645564 0.814663 1.435602
FE imp. Korea 0.132207 0.736313 -0.75817 1.997915
FE imp. Malaysia -0.69939 0.613318 -1.69642 (*) 0.285107 -1.46129 (*) 0.489463
FE imp. Mexico -1.87772 (*) 0.555758
FE imp. Nepal -3.81697 (*) 1.118899
FE imp. New Zealand -1.89569 (*) 0.684628
FE imp. Pakistan -2.76195 (*) 1.021776
FE imp. Peru -2.87663 0.729626
FE imp. Philipines -0.92819 0.679903 -3.54979 (*) 1.173397 -0.95681 0.909067
FE imp. Russia -3.87872 (*) 0.534941
FE imp. Singapore 0.155096 0.659551
FE imp. Sri Lanka -1.39999 1.197016
FE imp. Taiwan -4.94631 (*) 0.795521 -4.78316 (*) 1.022944
FE imp. Thailand -0.65328 0.642913 -3.36196 (*) 1.220548 -0.79733 0.95827
R² adj 0.8608 R² adj 0.8756 R² adj 0.85
F(41,271) 76.79 F(15,19) 112.81 F(33,181) 53.54
S.E. are Huber-White, corrected for pair-wise heteroskedasticity
(*)= Significantly different from zero at 10 % level
6.1 (APEC)
     Exporter Fixed Effects (sorted)
     Importer Fixed Effects (sorted)
Dependent Variable: Exports
OLS-estimates with Fixed Effects
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Table 8: Trade Potentials under 3 Scenarios 
 




Hong Kong -21.9 9.0 -36.6 -70.5
Japan 404.5 306.9 745.1 246.9
Mexico 489.9 794.8
New Zealand 145.8 366.9
Peru 110.4 -39.7
Russia -24.3 -65.0
Taiwan -88.3 -75.4 -71.1 -95.4
USA 191.1 446.6
Korea 631.3 310.4 616.6 455.1
Indonesia 120.8 749.1 125.2 187.5 1799.7 131.3
Malaysia 323.9 2489.9 135.5 329.8 797.1 132.1
Philippines 532.5 2750.3 841.2 694.6 2693.9 161.8
Singapore 159.4 2573.9 206.4 373.3 1134.0 259.9







Partner's Export Potentials to China (in %) Chinese Exports Potentials (in %)
 